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Privatization  in developing  countries  has been modest, with
little  contracting  out of services  and a wide gap between  plans
and achievements  - but the push for privatization  has limited
expansion  of public  enterprises.
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Pressure to move toward privatization has  Privatization tends to increase efficiency,
mounted in the face of severe economic crises.  but only if managers face a competitive rather
Privatization in developing countries has fo-  than a monopolistic tnvironment - which m.iy
cused almost exclusively on the divestiture of  require not only the sale of public enterprises but
industrial and commercial enterprises, not public  bidding for franchises, breaking up monopolies,
utilities or sectors characterized by monopoly.  and removing entry barriers.
The pace of privatization has been slow and its
impact modest. The reasons include the limited  Certain issues recur with privatization and
resources in the private sector (and popular re-  the contracting out of services, particularly in
sentment of foreign investors), the resistance of  the developing countries: the ways competition
such important interest groups as labor unions,  and ownership affect performance, the tension
and the inability of many governments to  between multiple objectives (such as generating
prepare adequately for the complex tasks of  more cash yet lowering the price of shares to
privatization.  But as a result of the push for pri-  widen ownership), and the proper balance
vatization, or reprivatization (the divestiture of  between the enterprise's autonomy and the
nationalized enterprises that were once private),  government's role in regulating market power.
some countries have resisted starting new public  The long-term benefits of privatization will not
enterprises or expanding old ones.  And some  materialize if these issues aren't thought
governments have encouraged joint ventures  through.
(with private partners, shareholders, or employ-
ees) to limit the flow of government funds and to  Contracting out of services, an important
make public enterprises more responsive to  feature of privatization in Britain and the United
market pressures.  States, is rare in the developing world, with such
exceptions as Argentina and the Ivory Coast.
Among developing countries, divestiture has  Contracting out, which is generally assumed to
been most effective in Chile and Bangladesh.  be simpler than privatization, is most effective
Africa has moved slower than Latin America.  when competition exists among suppliers, and
Many developing countries have preferred more  when government is inexperienced at delivery of
informal liquidation of public enterprises-  the services being conwracted  out but has incen-
through "mothballing" and slow death (by denial  tives to pursue efficiency and is committed to
of funds) - because it attracts less adverse  overseeing the contractors.
publicity than outright divestiture.
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IV.  Conclusion  ...................  29PRTVATIZATION  AND  THE  PUBLIC  SECTOR:  EMERGING  ISSUES 1
Privatization  has  emerged  as  a major  public  policy  issue  in  the
eighties  in  many  parts  of the  world. Britain,  France and  the  United
States  are  among  the  more  developed  countries  which  have  made  considerable
progress  in the  field  of  privatization.  In the  developing  world,  some
countries  like  Chil3,  Brazil,  South  Korea  and  Bangladesh  have  resorted  to
privatization  in  a significant  way  whereas  many  others  are  at  varying
stages  of planning  and  implementation  in their  privatization  programs. The
policy  dialogue  of the  World  Bank,  IMF  and  other  donors  with  LDC
governments  has in recent  years  focussed  on the  issue  of privatization,
among  others,  as a response  to the  poor  performance  of their  public
enterprises  and  mounting  public  deficits.
The  recent  literature  on privatization  can  be classified  into  two
categories.  One  set  of  writings  focuses  exclusively  on the  divestiture  of
stated-owned  commercial  and  industrial  enterprises.  Within  this  group,
some  are  concerned  with  privatization  in the  developed  countries  while
others  examine  privatization  issues  and  experiences  in  the  developed  and
1/  The  author  is grateful  to  Myrna  Alexander,  Bela  Balassa,  Arturo  Israel,
Lloyd  McKay  and  Mary  Shirley  for  useful  comments  on an earlier  draft  of
this  paper. He alone  is  responsible  for  any  errors  that  remain.developing  countries  (LDCs). 2 The  second  set  of  writings  deals  with the
privatization  of public  services  which  have  traditionally  been  delivered  by
government  departments/agencies. 3 The  literature  on this  subject  is
confined  largely  to  developed  country  experiences.  An important  difference
between  the  two  groups  is that  in  the  latter  case,  government  agencies  are
expected  to continue  to  play an  active  role  vis-a-vis  the  privatized
services  enrough  the  processes  of periodic  contracting  out,  monitoring  and
supervision.  This  is  not  perceived  to  be a  major  issue  in  the
privatization  of state-owned  enterprises  where  market  competition  is
assumed  to take  care  of the  private  enterprise  behavior  andA  performance. 4
In  both cases,  most  authors  are  concerned  primarily  with  '.mplementation
of  privatization  decisions,  the  approaches,  techniques  an,'  procedures  used,
and  proposals  for  better  planning  of privatization. 5 There  are,  of
2/ See  for  example,  Vickers,  J. S.  & Yarrow,  G. K. Privatization  and
Natural  Monopolies,  London,  1985;  Yarrow,  G. K.,  Privatization,  Economic
Policy,  April  1986;  Berg,  E.,  and  Shirley,  M.,  Divestiture  in Developing
Countri_s,  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  No. 11,  Washington,  D. C.,  1985,
Asian  Development  Bank,  Privatization:  Policies.  Methods  and  Procedures,
Manila,  1985.
3/  See  for  example,  Savas,  E. S.,  Privatization:  The  Key  to Better
Government,  Chatham  House,  N. J.,  1987;  Roth,  G.,  Private  Provision  of
Public  Services  in  Develooina  Countries,  Oxford  University  Press,  1987;
Young,  P.,  Privatization  Around  the  Globe,  Dallas,  1986.
4/ This is  not  to ignore  the  fact  that  in  the  case  of  public  utilities  that
do  not face  competition,  government  has  to interfere  in  pricing
decisions.
5/ See  Vuylesteke,  C.,  Techniques  of Privatization  of State-Owned
Enterprises,  Vol.  I,  Mimeo,  World  Bank,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1988;  Herley,
M. L. and  White,  T.  H., Privatization  for  DeveloDment,  International  Law
Institute,  Washington,  D. C.,  1987;  Marlin,  J. T.,  Contracting  Municipal
Servics, Wiley,  New  York,  1984.- 3 -
course,  important  policy  issues  which  emerge  from  the  experiences  of  both
developed  and  developing  countries  with  reference  to the  divestiture  of
state-owned  enterprises  and  the  contracting  out  of public  services. The
literature,  however,  does  not  provide  a  distillation  of such  strategic
issues  and their  implications  for  privatization  decisions  from  the
perspective  of LDCs.
Based  on a survey  of the  literature,  this  paper  reviews  the
privatization  experience  of  both  developed  and  developing  countries  with  a
view  to  highlighting  the  major  strategic  issues  which  seem  to emerge  from
this  wide  range  of experience.  The  primary  objective  here is  to  compare
experiences  and  pull  together  the  key  policy  issues  in  a summary  fashion.
These  are  issues  which  LDC  governments  embarking  on  privatization  and
donors  who advise  them  may  wish to  consider  carefully  even if  all  of them
are  not  equally  relevant  to all  countries.  The  paper,  however,  does  not
evaluate  privatization  techniques  nor  does  it  assess  the  Bank  projects
which  have  divestiture  components  as they  have  been  examined  by others. 6
We first  examine  the  privatization  experience  of the  U.K.  and
U.S.A.  as a  backdrop  against  which  to assess  the  experience  of LDCs.  The
reasons  for  the  differential  performance  of the  two  groups  of countries  and
some  of the  lessons  and  emerging  issues  associated  with  privatization  are
then  discussed. Privatization  here  refers  to  the (1)  sale  of all  or  some
of the  assets  of  public  enterprises  or other  public  entities;  (2)  the
6/ Shirley,  M.,  Guidelines  for  Bank  Lending  for  State-Owned  Enterprise
Sector  Reform,  World  Bank,  1988;  Vuylesteke,  op.cit;  Savas,  op.cit.- 4 -
leasing  of such  assets;  and (3)  the  transfer  of the  management  of public
entities  (without  transfer  of or.-ership)  and  contracting  out  of public
services  to  the  private  sector. Thus,  the  scope  of privatization  is  not
confined  to  the  enterprise  sector  or ownership  transfer  alone. Rather,  all
actions  leading  to a substitution  of private  for  public  provision  of goods
and  services  fall  within  the  purview  of privatization.
I. Privatization  in  the  Developed  Countries
Programs  of  privatization  are  under  way in  several  western
couAtries  such  as the  U.K.,  U.S.A.,  Canada,  France,  Spain  and  Italy. In
view  of data  limitations,  however,  discussion  here  will  not cover  all  the
relevant  country  experiences.  The  French  privatization  program,  for
example,  is  just  getting  under  way.  A total  of $10  billion  was expected  to
be raised  by the  French  government  through  divestiture  in  1987. The French
privatization  plan  covers  42  banks,  2 financial  holding  companies,  9
industrial  enterprises  and  3 insurance  companies.  The French  Government
accelerated  the  privatization  program  in  1987  in  response  to the  successful
sale  of the  first  two  enterprises. 7
It  was the  return  of  a conservative  government  in  1979  that  led  to
the  emergence  of a significant  privatization  progrim  in  the  U.K.  By 1987,
the  U.K.  had raised  nearly  $21  billion  through  the  privatization  of  public
7/ The  program,  however,  came  to  an end  with the  re-election  of President
Mitterand  and  the  constitution  of a socialist  government  in 1988.enterprises. 8 Of this  amount,  80  percent  was due  to the  sale  of eight
enterprises.  The  most  visible  elements  of the  program  have  been  the
complete  or partial  sales  of selected  public  enterprises,  the  sale  of
public  sector  housing  and  tt  ontracting  out  of some  public  services  to
the  private  sector. Between  .,79  and  1983,  nearly  600 ,00  public  housing
units  were  sold. 9 Until  1984,  the  sale  of public  enterprises  was  regarded
as the  least  important  component  of the  privatization  program. During  this
period,  ownership  transfer  was limited  to  enterprises  operating  in  a
competitive  market. The  sale  of British  Telecom  and  British  Gas  was  a
major  departure  from  this  pattern  as  both  were  dominant  firms  and  the
question  of  how to regulate  and  monitor  private  firms  with substantial
market  power  had to  be faced  for  the  first  time. The  creation  of a  new
regulatory  agency  for  the  telecommunication  industry  (OFTEL)  was  the
British  government's  response  to this  challenge.
Privatization  or  denationalization  in  Spain  was  initiated  by the
first  fully  socialist  government  the  country  has  ever  had.  The  Rumasa
holdings  which  the  Spanish  government  sold,  for  example,  consisted  of 20
8/ Including  the  proceeds  from  the  sale  of  British  Telecom  and  British  Gas
of which  $2.6  billion  will  be realized  only  in  April  1988.
9/  G. Yarrow,  "Privatization  in  Theory  and  Practice,"  Economic  Policy,
April  1986,  p. 326.- 6 -
banks  and  so"ae  60 companies. 10 In  Italy,  IRI,  one  of the  main  state-owned
holding  companies,  has sold  15  companies  and  and  4 banks  since  1980.
Several  Italian  public  enterprises  have  sold  their  stock  to  private
investors  on a  minority  basis.
In the  U.S.A.,  the  growth  of privatization  has  been  predominantly
in the  area  of "contracting  out"  of public  services. Urban  services  such
as  garbage  collection,  wastewater/sewage  treatment,  solid  waste  disposal,
electricity,  public  transportation  and  fire  protection  have  been  contracted
out  by many state  and  local  governments.  About  35  percent  of the  cities
in  the  United  States  used  private  contract  collection  for  residential
refuse  in 1982,  compared  to 21  percent  in 1975. Contracting  for  this
service  has  become  popular  also  in  the  U.K.,  West  Germany  and  Latin
America. 11 More than  75 communities  in the  United  States  contract  with
private  firms  to  operate  and  maintain  their  wastewater  treatment  plants.
Similarly,  87  percent  of the  electricity  users  in the  U.S.A.  get  their
power  from  one  of  nearly  200  private  companies. 12 The  U.S.  executive
10/  See  "Privatization,"  Financial  Times  (Section  III),  London,  September
10,  1987,  p. 7.
11/  C.  Valente  and  L.  Manchester,  Rethinking  Local  Services: Examining
Alternative  Aggroaches,  International  City  Management  Association,
Washington,  D.C.,  1984,  p. 4.
12/  Savas,  op.cit.,  p. 150. Also see  G.  Roth,  Private  Provision  of Public
Services  in  Developing  Countries,  Oxford  University  Press,  New  York,
1987;  H. P. Hatry,  A Review  of Private  ADDroaches  for  Delivery  of
Public  Services,  Urban  Institute,  Washington,  D. C.,  1983;  B. Stevens,
"Comparing  Public  and  Private  Sector  Productive  Efficiency:  An
Analysis  of Eight  Activities,"  National  Productivity  Review,  Autumn
1984.-7-
budget  for  1987  proposed  selling  all  power  generation  and  transmission
facilities  at federal  dams  while  retaining  ownership  and  control  over  the
dams  themselves.  A new  public  service  that  has  emerged  at the  local  level
is  resource  recovery  which  employs  an innovative  disposal  technology.
Private  firms  in the  U.S.A.  are  financing,  building  and  managing  these
capital  intensive  plants  under  contract  with local  governments.  A recent
study  has concluded  that  local  governments  in the  UJ.S.A.  are  more  likely  to
resort  to  privatization  when  budgetary  constraints  become  severe,  and  have
some  prior  experience  with  alternetive  service  delivery  methods. 13
Privatization  of industrial  and  commercial  public  enterprises  has
been insignificant  in the  U.S.A. The  main  reason  is  that  public
enterprises  are  a  minor  feature  of the  governmental  scene  in this  country.
The  public  enterprises  that  exist  are  for  the  most  part in  the
infrastructure  sectors  and  not in  manufacturing.  While  most  privatization
activities  in the  U.S.A.  have so far  been  concerned  with routine
housekeeping  or infrastructure  services,  the  latest  trend  is to  privatize
more  sensitive  areas  such  as  health  and  human  services  and  public  safety.
The  contracting  out  of  child  welfare  services  through  competitive  bidding
has  become  increasingly  popular. A growing  number  of local  governments  are
now  contracting  out  the  management  and  operation  of public  hospitals  to
commercial  hospital  chains. A 1982  survey  showed  that  47  percen':  of the
cities  and  counties  (responding  to the  survey)  had sub-contracted  emergency
medical  service  to private  operators. A sample  survey  showed  that  44
13/  R. W. Poole  & P.E.  Fixler,  "The  Privatization  of Public  Sector  Services
in  Practice: Experience  and  Potential,"  unpublished  mimeo.,  1986,  p.3.8-
percent  of public  law  enforcement  agencies  had conttacted  out  t t l
protection  of  public  property. 14 Turnkey  prisons  built  and  operated  by
private  firms  and  water  supply  services,  large  solid  waste  disposal  and  gas
recovery  waste-to-energy  plants  are  other  examples  of  new  privatization
activity. 15 There  is speculation  that  the  technology  of limited  access
highway  networks  with  electronic  road  pricing  systems  (eliminating  the  need
for  toll  booths)  might  offer  scope  for  further  privatization  in the
tran.-portation  sector. Experimental  programs  in  Minnesota  have  be  .anded
by the  state  for  school  districts  (local)  to  contract  out  to  groups  of
teacherr  the  task  of teaching  non-core  subjects  such  as art  and  music.
The  privatization  experiences  of the  U.K.  and  U.S.A.  have several
noteworthy  features. First  of all,  in  both countries  a  combination  of
severe  budgetary  constraints,  increasing  failure  of the  public  delivery  of
some  services,  and  a strong  political  commitment  in  favor  of the  private
sector  contributed  significantly  to the  progress  of  privatization.  The
reduction  in  the  federal  support  to  state  and  local  governments  and  the
drying  up of other  sources  of revenue  were important  factors  in the  U.S.
The rising  budget  deficits  of the  goverTament  and  the  need  to reduce  public
borrowing  requirements  weighed  heavily  in  the  U.K.  context.  Second,  the
relatively  fast  pace  of  privatization  in  the  U.K.  and  U.S.  seems  to  be
14/  ICMA,  The  Munici2al  Yearbook,  1983 (Washington,  D.C.),  pp.  216-217.
15/  Sandra  Bellush,  "Private  Choices,"  American  City  and  Country,  October,
1985,  p. 62.-9-
associated  with the  existei,ce  in  these  countries  of a strong  private  se^tor
and  well  developed  capital  markets. For  example,  in  both  countries,  there
are  numerous  firms  and  contractors  interested  in and  capable  of taking  over
and  managitug  public  assets. There  is a large  middle  class  with resources
to invest  in the  shares  of the  public  enterprises  being  divested. The
undervaluation  of shares  when selling  public  enterprises  may  also  have
contributed  to the  demand  pull  from  the  public. Nearly  20  percent  of the
adult  populatior  of the  U.K.  now  own  company  shares. In the  case  of the
British  Telecom,  47.4  percent  of the  shares  were  bought  by institutional
investors,  34.3  percent  by British  nationals  and  18.3  percent  by o'verseas
investors.
Third,  the  British  experience  shows  that  the  profit  performance  of
several  of the  divested  enterprises  improved  significantly  since
privatization.  Managerial  autonomy  made  possible  by the  elimination  of
political  control  seems  to  have  made  a  positive  impact  on  performance.  For
example,  the  flexibility  managers  enjoy  in  pricing  and investment
decisions,  personnel  matters  and  performance  evaluation  and  incentive
setting  are  deemed  to  have  played  an important  role  in this  context. It is
possible  that  to  some  extent  the  partial  economic  recovery  in  the  U.K.
since  1081  also  helped. After  a careful  review  of the  performance  of the
privatized  enterprises,  Yarrow's  conclusion  is  that  there  is  no  hard
evidence  to support  the  claim  that  improved  financial  performance  reflects
efficiency  gains  in  all  cases. 16 The  evidence  from  the  U.S. on
corktrActing  out  also  rlaims  that  private  provision  of services  are  on the
16/  Yarrow,  on.  cit.,  pp. 337-340.10  -
whole  more  cost  effective  than  their  public  counterparts.  In  solid  waste
collection,  public  provision  of the  service  has  been  found  to  be 68 percent
more  costly  than  the  private  alternative. 17 Similarly,  a comparative
study  of governmental  and  contractor  provision  of eight  local  public
services  in  California  found  that  contractor  provision  was significantly
less  expensive  for  seven  of the  eight  services,  the  only  exception  being
payroll  servicing. 18
Fourth,  privatization  of monopolistic  enterprises  has  been
followed  by the  creation  of specialized  industry  specific  institutions  to
regulate  their  operations. In  the  U.K.,  separate  regulatory  bodies  have
been established  to  monitor  the  newly  privatized  telecom  and  gas
enterprises.  These  specialized  institutions  are  required,  in  part,  to  help
build  up the  highly  specialized  information  and  expertise  necessary  for
effectively  monitoring  the  behavior  of dominant  firms  which  are  likely  to
resort  to  predatory  pricing. The importance  of this  function  and  the
institutional  mechanisms  involved  were  not  fully  anticipated  by those  who
planned  the  U.K.  privatization&  pre~gram.  On the  whole,  U.K.  policy  did  not
fully  take  into  account  (at  the  planning  stage)  the  problems  likely  to  be
faced  by regulators  in  trying  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  monopoly  power  by
dominant  firms. The  establishment  of the  regulatory  agencies,  however,  is
no guarantee  that  the  function  will  be effectively  performed. The  capture
of  regulators  by the  regulated  is  not  uncommon.
17/  Quoted  in  Poole  and  Fisler,  op.cit.,  p. 6.
18/  Ibid.,  p. 9.- 11  -
II.  Privatization  in  LDCs
It is in  the  past six  years  that  privatization  has  been  widely
debated  and  acted  upon  in the  developing  world. This  is  not  to deny  that
in the  1970s,  a few  countries  (Chile,  Bangladesh  and  Pakistan,  for  example)
had  resorted  to  privatLzation  or reprivatization  because  they  were  in
effect  returning  nationalized  enterprises  back  to the  private  sector.
Their  privatization  programs  have  continued  into  the  eighties  too. The
focus  of this  section,  however,  is  on the  post  1980  period  when a  much
larger  number  of LDCs,  facing  severe  economic  crises,  designed  policies  and
programs  for  privatization.  A recent  survey  of such  programs  in  28  LDCs
shows  that  of their  3,975  public  enterprises,  35  were liquidated,  102  were
closed,  85  were  sold (fully  or  partially)  and  45  were leased  or their
management  contracted  out. 19 The  value  of assets  of these  enterprises  is
not  known. It is  therefore  difficult  to  pass  any  judgment  on the
significance  of the  divestiture  that  has  occurred. But  as a  percentage  of
the  total  number  of  public  enterprises  in these  countries,  the  number  of
public  enterprises  sold  is  only  two  percent,  the  number  leased  or
contracted  out is  about  one  percent  and  the  number  closed  or liquidated  is
3.4  percent. There  is some  evidence  that  the  divested  enterprises  in  many
countries  vere  relatively  small  enterprises.  In Brazil,  for  example,  of
the  17  public  enterprises  sold,  only  one  had  employment  exceeding  1,000
workers. On the  other  hand,  even  a small  country  such  as  Jamaica  had  sold
a much  larger  number  of  public  enterprises  (33  jute  mills  and  26  cotton
19/  Elliot  Berg  and  Mary  Shirley,  Divestiture  in  DeveloDing  Countries,
World  Bank  Discussion  Paper  No. 11,  1987,  pp.  25-30.- 12 -
textile  mills  by the  end  of 1983). Global  generalizations  tend  to  hide
these  variations.
Another  study  provides  a breakdown  of the  public  enterprises
targeted  for  divestiture  by country  and  region. 20 In  Africa,  nearly  35
percent  of the  public  enterprises  in  16 countries  were targeted  for
privatization.  In Latin  America,  16  percent  of the  public  enterprises  in
12 countries,  and in  Asia,  3  percent  in  9 countries  were  targeted  for
privatization.  In  Africa  and  Latin  America,  it  would  seem  that  rather
ambitious  programs  of privatization  were  planned. Effective  divestiture
was  the  highest  in  Zaire,  Bangladesh  and  Chile,  in  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin
America  respectively. 21 (as  a  percentage  of the  total  number  of  public
enterprises).
Reviews  of the  progress  of privatization  in  LDCs  reveal  several
interesting  features:
(1) Compared  to the  privatization  programs  in  the  U.K.,  and  the
U.S.,the  LDC  achievements  in  general,  seem  to  have  been quite
modest  in  scale  and  their  pace  of  progress  has  been  on the  whole
mu.eh  slower. 22 Among  the  regions,  Africa  seems  to  have  moved
more slowly  than  Latin  America  where  countries  like  Chile  and
20/  R.  Hemming  and  Ali  Mansoor,  Privatization  and  Public  Enterprises,
unpublished  manuscript,  IMF,  1987.
21/  Most  of the  divestiture  in  Chile  and  Bangladesh  took  place  in the
seventies.
22/  "Big  Obstacles  Bar  Way",  Financial  Times,  London,  September  16,  1987.- 13 -
Argentina  have  achieved  greater  progress. Liquidation  and  closure
of firms  rather  than  divestiture  seem  to  be the  preferred  approach
to  privatization  in  a number  of LDCs. 23 Here  again,  informal
liquidations  have  been  more  frequent  than  formal  liquidations.
"Mothballing"  and  slow  death  of  public  ent -prises  (by  denying
additional  funds,  for  example)  tend  to  attract  less  public
attention  than  outright  divestiture  and the  adverse  publicity  and
political  hostility  it  generates. Furthermore,  according  to  some
observers,  the  degree  of political  commitment  associated  with  the
U.K. program,  for  example,  is  not  evident  in  several  of the  LDC
cases.24
(2) Most  of the  privatized  firms  are in  consumer  or  capital  goods,  and
not in  public  utilities  or sectors  characterized  by monopoly.
This  is  not to  say  that  targeted  enterprises  do  not  include
dominant  firms. Data  on their  market  power  are  simply  not
available. It  may  be safe  to  conclude,  however,  that  most  of them
are in  potentially  competitive  industries  and  not  natural
monopolies  which  require  regulation.  There  is  general  agreement
in the  literature  on this  point.
23/  Berg  and  Shirley,  02.cit.;  Hemming  and  Mansoor,  op.cit. It is,  of
course,  true  that  liquidation  and  closure  have  been  practiced  before
the  1980s  too.
24/  S. Commander  and  T. Killick,  "Privatization  in  Developing  Countries,"
mimeo,  1987,  p. 3.- 14 -
(3)  Contracting  out  of public  services  which  has  been  an important
feature  of the  U.S.  and  U.K.  privatization  programs  is  conspicuous
by its  absence  in the  developing  world. A few  countries  such  as
Argentina  and  Ivory  Coast  have  contracted  out  enterprises  or
services. The  focus  of privatization  in  LDCs  however,  has  been
almost  exclusively  on the  divestiture  of industrial  and  commercial
enterprises.  A major  reason  for  this  is the  overriding  concern
about  budgetary  deficits  and  the  hope  that  the  divestiture  of
public  enterprises  would  bring  in  much  needed  revenues  to  minimize
these  deficits. Contracting  out  of  public  services  may improve
efficiency,  but entails  highly  decentralized  operations  usually
handled  by provincial  and  local  governments.  Even  if some  assets
are  sold  in  the  process,  there  is  no guarantee  that  the  proceeds
will accrue  to the  central  government.
(4) The  pressure  to  divest  public  enterprises  has led  some  governments
to  offer  concessions  to  potential  buyers  in  terms  of price  and
other  conditions  of sale. 25 Often  LDC  governments  are  not  in  a
strong  position  to  bargain  with  potential  buyers. The latter  have
in general  managed  to  extract  special  privileges  (tax  holidays,
subsidies,  protection  against  external  competition)  which  minimize
their  risks. There  are,  of course,  instances  where  new  burdens
were  imposed  on the  private  sector  as  a result  of privatization.
For  example,  the  buyer  may  be forced  to  keep  excess  labor  by a
25/  Tbid.,  p. 29.- 15 -
sr6lling  government  which  refuses  to  permit  retrenchment.  In
general,  however,  while  the  divestiture  of public  enterprises  has
contributed  to  the  revenues  of the  state  at a time  of severe
financial  stringency,  it  may  have  led  to costly  distortions  in the
economy  and  potential  revenue  losses  in the  future  in some  cases.
Why  has  the  pace  of privatization  in  LDCs  been  rather  slow  and  its
im.act  modest  though  many  countries  had  proposed  fairly  ambitious
divestiture  programs? Some  might  argue  that  the  process  has  just  got
started  and that  it is too  early  to  pass  a  verdict. While  granting  that
there  is  something  to  be said  for  this  argument,  the  fact  remains  that  for
several  reasons,  there  remains  a  wide gap  between  the  plans  for
privatization  in  LDCs  and  the  corresponding  achievements. 26
(1) Among  the  factors  responsible  for  this  gap,  one  of the  most  widely
reported  in  the  literature  is  the  limited  capacity  of the  private
sector  in  many  LDCs.  In  countries  which  have a limited  or
relatively  undeveloped  private  sector,  there  is  bound  to  be a
narrow  range  of buyers. If  public  enterprises  are  rationalized  or
toned  up  before  sale,  a larger  number  of  potential  buyers  might
emerge. Breaking  up large  enterprises  into  parts  of interest  to
smaller  buyers  may also  help.  For  example,  a state  farm  could  be
subdivided  and  sold  to several  private  farmers. In  general,
however,  the  sophistication,  resources,  and institutional  capacity
26/  Based  on the  review  papers  cited  earlier.- 16
of the  capital  market,  the  legal  framework,  and the  infrastructure
required  for  consultancy,  underwriting,  speedy  communieat!on,
etc.,  tend  to  be modest  or  poorly  developed  in such  countries. A
large  scale  program  of privatization  does  not  make  much sense
under  these  conditions. If  the  local  buyers  and their  resources
and  infrastructure  are  limited,  the  only  alternative  is  to depend
on foreign  buyers. However,  in  LDCs  which  are  politically  hostile
to the  sale  of enterprises  to foreigners,  it  is  unlikely  that  this
option  will  be used  except  marginally.  A major  wave of
privatization  will  not  occur  under  these  conditions.  The  question
whether  anti-foreign  attitudes  are  rational  or not is  beside  the
point.
(2) Resistance  to  privatization  from  important  interest  groups  is  a
fact  to  be reckoned  with in  the  LDC  context. 27 Trade  unions  in
the  public  sector  are  often  strong  in  their  opposition  to
privatization.  Many  public  enterprises  are  overmanned  and  unions
therefore  feel  threatened  by the  spectre  of retrenchment.  In
countries  controlled  by strong  political  regimes,  (e.g.,  military
dictatorships),  this  problem  may  not  be serious  for  obvious
reasons. Similarly,  political  and  bureaucratic  interests  are
often  averse  to  what  they  perceive  to  be a threat  to their  power
and  patronage. Intellectuals  in  some  LDCs  oppose  privatization  on
distributional  grounds. There  could  thus  emerge  a powerful
27/  Commander  and  Killick,  oR.cit.- 17 -
combination  of interests  against  privatization  in  a number  of
LDCs,  whereas  in  the  more  developed  countries,  opposition  is
generally  much less  pronounced  as is  clear  from  the  U.K. and  U.S.
experiences.  The issue  here is  not  whether  such  opposition  is
rational,  but that  its  existence  slows  the  pace  of privatization
and  limits  its  scope  even  if there  is  a political  commitment  to
get  on  with it.
(3) The  problem  is exacerbated  by the  inabil.ty  of many  LDC
governments  to  prepare  adequately  to implement  privatization.  In
part,  this  inability  could  be attributed  to  a lack  of  knowledge  or
limited  capacity  to foresee  the  complexities  involved  in
privatization.  But it  may, in  some  cases,  be due  to  the
government's  reluctance  to  move  forward  which  in  turn  reflects  its
lack  of will  or  political  commitment  to divest. 28 At least,  some
governments  seem  to  have  underestimated  the  management  problems  of
divestiture. 29 A privatization  program  is  a complex  and  huge
operation  which  requires  careful  preparatory  work  and  good
management  on the  part  of the  government.  A detailed  analysis  and
classification  of public  enterprises  to  determine  which  need  to  be
divested,  settlement  of labor-related  matters  and  of legal  and
financial  liabilities  which  buyers  are  usually  unwilling  to  take
28/  Commander  and  Killick,  o.Rcit.
29/  Berg  and  Shirley,  op.cit.,  p. 11.- 18 -
over,  proper  valuation  of these  enterprises,  assignment  of clear
administrative  responsibility  for  implementing  the  program,
resolution  of policy  and  administrative  conflicts,  and  assembly  of
the  speaialized  technical  expertise  necessary  to  prepare  for  and
negotiate  the  divestiture  case  by case  are  key components  of such
preparatory  work.  Lack  of systematic  artention  to them  and  the
consequent  underestimation  of the  efforts  required  have  caused
avoidable  delays  and  errors  to the  detriment  of the  privatization
programs  of some  LDC  governments.
III. Emerging  Issues
An important  conclusion  of this  review  is  that  the  extent  of
privatization  that  has  occurred  in  many  LDCs,  for  which  data  are  available
is  modest  in  relation  to their  planned  programs  of divestiture. 30 The
scale  and  pace  of  privatization  in the  more  developed  countries,  in
relative  terms,  has  been  more  impressive.  In  part,  this  reflects  the
ideological  shift  that  has  occurred  in  the  governments  and  the  society  at
large  in several  of the  western  countries. 31 Thus  in the  U.K.  and  the
U.S.,  strong  political  leaders  with  a commitment  to the  private  sector  have
30/  The  basic  sources  of data  used  are  the  papers  by Hemming  & Mansoor  and
Berg  and  Shirley  (cited  above).
31/  Commander  and  Killick,  2.Rcit.- 19  -
been  responsible  for  the  wave  of privatization  that  has  taken  place. 32
They  came  to  power  without  any  ideological  attachment  to the  previous
regimes  which  had set  up most  of their  public  enterprises.  Similar
ideological  and  political  shifts  have  not  yet taken  place  in  most  LDCs.
Chile  in  Latin  America  and  Guinea  in  Africa  are  notable  exceptions.  In
many other  LDCs,  political  leaders  who  set  up the  public  enterprises  are
still  in  power.  In  cases  where  changes  have  occurred,  leaders  may still  be
committed  to the  same  ideology  or political  parties. Even  where  there  is
little  evidence  of an ideological  shift,  the  push for  privatization  has
caused  several  LDC  governments  not to further  expand  public  enterprises  or
start  new  ones.  In  some  cases,  governments  have  begun  to  encourage  private
sector  joint  ventures  with existing  public  enterprises,  thus  limiting  the
flow  of government  resources  into  the  public  sector  for  expansion. A
comparative  analysis  of the  privatization  experiences  in the  developed
countries  and  LDCs  highlights  several  important  issues  and  lessons.
1.  Privatization  and  Efficiency  Gains
The transfer  of  productive  activities  to the  private  sector  is
generally  believed  to improve  economic  efficiency.  Reduction  in  political
interference,  the  exercise  of  greater  autonomy  by managers,  and  the
flexibility  to adjust  prices  as  demand  and  supply  as conditions  change  are
32/  The importance  of  political  leadership  and  ideology  should  not  be
exaggerated. Privatization  has  occurred  also  in  countries  with
socialist  governments  such  as  Austria,  Finland  and  Spain.- 20 -
features  of  privatized  operations  which  are  expected  to  contribute  to
greater  efficiency.  Though  privatization  is  likely  to lead  to a greater
emphasis  on  profit  goals,  the  transfer  of ownership  by itself  need  not
necessarily  augment  productive  and  allocative  efficiency  significantly. 33
The  existence  of competition  and  effective  regulation  where  market  failure
exists  and  competition  is  limited  are  more important  determinants  of
economic  performance  and  efficiency  than  privatization  per  se. 34 If  there
are  deficiencies  in these  areas,  the  approach  under  normal  conditions
should  be to increase  competition  end  strengthen  the  regulatory  function
and  not  merely  to transfer  productive  activities  to the  private  sector. It
is through  behavioral  changes  in  managers  and  owners  induced  by shifts  in
incentives  that  privatization  tends  to influence  performance.  Thus
privatization  generally  induces  managers  to  pursue  profit  goals. But
whether  this  will  lead  to  an increase  in  efficiency  would  depend  on  whether
they  face  a competitive  rather  than  a monopolistic  environment.  The  sale
33/  Yarrow,  op.cit.,  p. 363. There  is some  empirical  evidence,  however,
that  private  enterprises  are  more  efficient  than  public  enterprises  in
developing  countries.  The  two  need  not,  of course,  be operating  under
comparable  conditions  even  in  the  same  country. See,  for  example,
B.  Balassa,  Public  Entergrises  in  Develoning  Countries: Issues  of
Privatization,  DRD  Discussion  Paper  No.  292,  World  Bank,  Washington,
D.C.,  1987.
34/  Samuel  Paul,  "Privatization  and  the  Public  Sector,"  Finance  and
Development,  December,  1985.- 21 -
of a  public  enterprise  by itself  will  not  cause  any  change  in the  market
structure. Other  actions  such  as  breaking  up of monopolies,  removal  of
entry  barriers  and  franchise  bidding  where  natural  monopolies  cannot  be
eliminated  are  necessary  to induce  greater  competition.35
2.  Privatization  and  Regulation
The  privatization  of British  Telecom  and  British  Gas,  both  giant
monopolies,  has  brought  into  focus  the  new  regulatory  role  that  governments
should  play  when  a competitive  market  structure  does  not  prevail. The
potential  inefficiencies  associated  with  market  power  are  serious  enough  to
warrant  special  attention  in the  context  of privatization.  The  theory  of
contestable  markets  which  is invoked  to deny  the  need for  regulation
applies  only  to conditions  where  sunk  costs  are  absent. 36 Similarly,
franchise  bidding  (letting  entrepreneurs  compete  at the  stages  of entry  and
contract  renewal)  can  be shown  to improve  efficiency  in  monopoly  settings
where  problems  of contract  specification,  monitoring  and  contract  renewal
are  relatively  simple. These  conditions,  however,  do  not  apply  to  dominant
public  enterprises.  Where  significant  investments  in  durable  specific
35/  Yarrow,  oR.cit.
36/  Contestable  markets  are  those  where  the  threat  of entry  by rivals
exists  because  exit is  easy.  Even  if  the  number  of firms  is  limited,
the  threat  of entry  by potential  rivals  is  seen  as an adequate
safeguard  to limit  incumbent  firms'  anti-competitive  behavior.- 22  -
assets  are  required  and  contracts  operate  under  technological  and  market
uncertainties,  franchise  bidding  will require  a complex  administrative
apparatus  not  very  different  from  a regulatory  system. Simple  deregulation
or franchising  will  not  therefore  be enough  to  prevent  the  abuse  of  market
power. More  vigorous  regulation  of anti-competitive  practices  may  be
required  to  cope  with the  problem  as incumbent  firms  could  counter  the
removal  of statutory  entry  barriers  with  strategic  entry  barriers  or
predatory  practices.37
The  creation  of  specialized  regulatory  bodies  to  monitor  the
privatized  British  Telecom  and  British  Gas  was  a  step  in  the  right
direction. Though  the  risk  of interest  groups  capturing  the  ragulators  is
real,  the  design  of regulatory  policy  and  institutions  should  be a  matter
of  priority  for  governments  which  face  anti-competitive  practices  in their
industries.  This  argument  applies  equally  well to  public  sector
monopolies. Most  LDCs  and  international  donor  agencies  are  yet to  pay
adequate  attention  to  this  issue. This  question  w.ll  assume  special
significance  as and  where  LDCs  begin  to  privatize  public  utilities,  for
example.
37/  Yarrow,  og,cit. The  verdict  on franchise  bidding  is  mixed. Franchise
bidding  may  work in  the  case  of  local  service  airlines,  postal
delivery,  trucking,  etc.,  where  the  winning  bidder  can  be easily
displaced  without  serious  asset  valuation  problems  and  such  assets  have
an active  secondhand  market. See  Williamson,  The  Economic  Institutions
of Capitalism,  the  Free  Press,  New  York,  1985.- 23 -
3.  p  licting  Objectives
Privatization  is  often  resorted  to  by governments  with  multiple
objectives.  Thus,  improving  efficiency  and  competition,  reduction  of
public  deficits,  cash  generation,  elimination  of  political  interference  in
enterprise  management,  and  widening  of the  ownership  of economic  assets  are
among  the  objectives  of  privatization  adopted  by governments.
The simultaneous  pursuit  of these  objectives,  however,  is  not
easy. The -oal  of  widening  share  ownership  in the  U.K.  has  led  the
government  t. consistently  underprice  the  shares  of  public  enterprises  on
the  stock  market,  thereby  hurting  its  cash  generation  objective. 38 The
recent  decision  to sell  25  percent  of the  British  Airports  Authority  by
tender  is  an improvement  on this  situation.  More  importantly,  the  need  to
generate  revenues  through  the  sale  of public  enterprises  has led  some
governments  to  pay  less  attention  to  the  goal  of increasing  efficiency  and
competition.  To generate  cash,  the  British  government  had  turned  to  the
sale  of its  large  monopolistic  public  enterprises.  Some  public  enterprises
which  are  in the  more  competitive  industries  are  yet  to  be privatized.  Yet
the  latter  could  have  made  a greater  contribution  to the  goal  of efficiency
improvement  through  privatization.  A monopolistic  firm  will  have to  be
regulated  in  addition  to  privatization  in  order  to  yield  efficiency  gains.
LDC  governments,  faced  with  rising  public  deficits,  are  also  under  pressure
to sell  their  dominant  public  enterprises,  but  with scant  attention  paid  to
38/ "Privatization  Revisited,"  The  Economist,  July 18,  1987,  p.17.- 24 -
its  impact  on efficiency  and  competition.  Protection  from  imports,  offer
of subsidies  and  other  conceseions  which  potential  buyers  are  able  to
extract  generally  lead  to inefficient  outcomes  even if  the  cash  generation
objective  is  achieved  in the  short  run. Similarly,  for  natural  monopolies,
sole  reliance  on the  disciplines  of market  competition  and  capital  market
monitoring  will  not  be adequate  to  produce  efficient  outcomes  when firms
are  privately  owned.
4.  Efficiency  and  Accountability  in  Contracting  Out
The  major  argument  for  contracting  out  public  services  is that  it
is a  more  efficient  alternative  compared  to the  bureaucratic  delivery  of
services. Experience  in the  United  States  and  other  countries,  however,
shows  that  efficient  contracting  out  is  contingent  on the  presence  of
factors  such  as competition  in  the  supplier's  market,  and  adequate
information  on the  part  of  buyers  and  sellers. 39 In addition  to  these
conditions,  contracting  out  has  been found  to  be effective  when  government
does  not  have the  requisite  experience  or expertise  to supply  a service;
wlen  government  has to  provide  a service  only  occasionally  or seasonally;
where  fair  competitive  procedures  can  be adopted  and  enforced;  and  where
government  has the  commitment  and  resources  to exercise  effective  oversight
over  delivery  by contractors.
39/  R.H.  De  Hoog,  Contracting  Out for  Human  Services.  State  University  of
New  York Press,  New  York,  1984,  p. 130-143.- 25 -
But  there  are  several  reasons  why  these  conditions  may  not  always
obtain,  especially  in  LDCs.  Some  case  studies  of contracting  out  in the
U.S.  have shown  that  though  efficiency  was  the  objective,  neither
government  officials  nor  contractors  were  primarily  interested  in  cutting
costs  and improving  service  quality. Government  agencies  may  contract  cout
in response  to organizational  imperatives  such  as ceilings  on  agency
personnel,  hiring  freeze,  or the  need to  commit  funds  by fiscal  year's  end.
Fiscal  constraints  may limit  the  resources  to gather  information,  evaluate
alternatives  adequately  and  exercise  effective  oversight. Procedures  for
contracting  may  be designed  to favor  suitable  suppliers  and  not  to  promote
efficiency.  Thus  the  personal  goals  of officials,  organizational  pressures
and  the  lack  of information  and  organization  on the  part  of  beneficiaries
(clients)  may  conspire  to defeat  the  objective  of achieving  efficiency
through  the  contracting  out  of  public  services. 40 Contracting  out,  then,
is  not  a costless  alternative. It is  important,  therefore,  to choose  this
alternative  for  service  delivery  only  when  competition  is  built  into  both
the  environment  and  procedures,  incentives  are  provided  for  decision  makers
to  pursue  effectiveness  and  efficiency,  a suitable  process  for  the  review
of expenditures,  performance  and  outcomes  exist,  and  resources  are
available  and  are  utilized  to  perform  an effective  oversight  function. In
brief,  the  benefits  of contracting  out  should  be weighed  against  the  costs
imposed  by the  organizational  context  in  which  contracting  takes  place.
40/  Ibid.- 26 -
5.  Efficiency  in  the  Public  Sector
Those  who  have  reviewed  the  LDC  experience  with  privatization  seem
to  be pessimistic  about  the  potential  of the  d'vestiture  of  public
enterprises  as the  primary  vehicle  to solve  the  problems  of  public  sector
inefficiency. 41 The  exclusive  focus  on the  sale  of public  enterprises
with the  deficit  reduction  objective  in  view  has  meant  the  neglect  of other
options  which  may  well  be more  practicable  in the  LDC  context. It is
imperative,  therefore,  that  intermediate  solutions  be explored  that  fit  the
circumstances  of LDCs  and  help  governments  at the  same  time  to take
positive  steps  towards  solving  the  problem  of  poor  public  sector
performance. Fir£t  of all,  it is  useful  to  explore  the  potential  for
contracting  out  parts  of the  production  and  distribution  operations  of
public  enterprises  to the  private  sector. It  will  be easier  to  find
subcontractors  in  LDCs  to  manufacture  components  and  ancillary  items  or
provide  services  needed  by large  enterprises  than  to find  local
entrepreneurs  to  buy them  outright. The  hiving  off  of ancillary  activities
will  reduce  the  assets  and  management  problems  of large  public  enterprises.
In the  manufacturing  sector,  the  contracting  out  of components  and  other
technical  services  may  have  to  be coupled  with support  programs  for  small
or  medium  scale  local  entrepreneurs  so  as to enable  them  to  maintain  the
required  quality  and  standards. In several  cases,  there  will  be scope  for
hiving  off  goods  and  services  unrelated  to  production  operations  that
41/  Berg  and  Shirley,  OR.  cit;  Hemming  and  Mansoor,  oR.  cit;  S. Commander  &
T. Killick,  oR.cit.- 27 -
state-owned  enterprises  now  provide. Examples  are  catering  services,
health  and  educational  services,  transport,  maintenance  of  premises,  etc.
It is  also  possible  that  facilities  and  equipment  could  be leased  to
private  contractors  who  may then  deliver  the  required  goods  and  services  to
the  state-owned  enterprise  or  other  clients. Public  sector  holding
companies  could  sell  off  some  of their  units  while  retaining  their  primary
activities.  In some  countries  such  as  Britain  and  France,  the  less
important  subsidiaries  of state-owned  enterprises  such  as  railways,  ports
and  telecommunications,  have  been  hived  off,  leaving  the  core  activities
only  in the  public  sector. This  approach  is appropriate  in  cases  where
outright  privatization  seems  politically  unacceptable  or not  feasible  for
other  reasons  such  as the  concern  about  market  power.
Second,  much greater  attention  should  be given  to the  ways  and
means  to increase  competition  in  the  industries  in  which  public  enterprises
operate. Deregulation  that  permits  private  entrepreneurs  to  compete  with
public  enterprises  is  one  option. This  will  call  for  a complete  or partial
removal  of the  barriers  to  entry  by private  entrepreneurs  in  sectors
reserved  for  state-owned  enterprises.  Even  without  the  entry  of  private
firms,  it is  possible  to generate  competitive  pressures  within  the  public
sector. Natural  monopolies,  for  instance,  may  lend  themselves  to  be broken
up on a regional  basis  without  much  loss  of scale  economies. Individual
power  stations  could  be separately  incorporated  and  permitted  to sell
electricity  to the  national  grid. This  is likeL,  to increase  competition
at the  generation  stage. Public  or  private  distribution  companies
(regional,  if  necessary)  could  buy from  the  grid  and  sell  to the  public.- 28 -
The  grid  could  be jointly  owned  by the  distribution  companies  or remain  as
a public  entity. A similar  approach  could  be applied  to service  industries
such  as insurance  and  banking  in  which  government  may  wish  to  play  a
dominant  role.  Instead  of leaving  such  services  to  monolithic  undertakings
which  face  no competition,  each  enterprise  could  be split  up and  several
entities  created,  consistent  with the  requirements  of the  economics  of
scale.
Third.  public  enterprises  could  be made  more  responsive  to  market
pressures  by turning  them  into  joint  ventures  with  private  partners,
shareholders  or employees. Government  may  still  have  a decisive  voice,  but
the  greater  autonomy  and  active  role  played  by private  partners  could  lead
to improved  performance.  This  could  be accomplished  through  a capital
increase  of the  state-owned  enterprise  and  new  public  subscription  or
through  a merger. This  approach  has  also  the  merit  of reducing  the  flow  of
government  resources  to support  the  operation  of these  enterprises.  In
Tunisia,  the  government's  equity  in  a state-owned  textile  company  was
reduced  from  88 to  49 percent  through  a capital  increase. 42 Another
promising  approach  is to  promote  employee  stock  ownership  plans  along  the
lines  attempted  in  the  United  States. There  is  some  evidence  that
productivity  and  enterprise  performance  have improved  through  partial
employee  ownership. There  is  an urgent  need to invent  imaginative  ways  of
encouraging  better  performance  and  greater  competition  in the  public
sector. Even  if the  objective  is to  divest  certain  public  enterprises
eventually,  the  experience  of a number  of  LDCs  confirms  that  the  steps
taken  to improve  their  operational  management  and  performance  have  helped
42/  See  Vuylesteke,  OR-cit.,  p. 21.- 29 -
to  prepare  the  ground  better  for  the  process  of divestiture. 43
IV.  Conclusion
Compared  to the  privatization  programs  in  developed  countries,  the
extent  and the  pace  of privatization  in  developing  countries  has  been  quite
modest. Contracting  out  of public  services  which  has  been  a notable
feature  of  privatization  in the  U.K. and  the  U.S.A.  has  been  conspicuous  by
its  absence  in the  developing  world. The  wide  gap  between  the  plans  for
privatization  and  the  corresponding  achievements  in  developing  countries
seems  to  be due  to a  combination  of factors  such  as the  limited  capacity
and  resources  of the  private  sector  in these  countries,  the  resistance  to
privatization  from  important  interest  groups  such  as trade  unions,  and  the
inability  of  many  developing  country  governments  to  prepare  adequately  for
privatization.  It  should  be noted,  however,  that  the  push  for
privatization  has  caused  governments  in  a  number  of countries  not  to
further  expand  existing  public  enterprises  or to start  new  ones.
The  paper  has  highlighted  several  important  issues  which  have
emerged  from  the  privatization  experiences  of  both developed  and  developing
countries. Their  implications  have  become  clearer  as evidence  from  the
field  has  accumulated.  Of these  issues,  the  tension  between  the  multiple
objectives  of privatization,  the  balance  between  the  autonomy  of
enterprises  and  the  government's  role  in regulating  market  power,  and  the
43/  USAID,  v  Enterprise  Develonment,  Washington,  D.C.,  1985,  p. 15.- 30 -
role  of competition  and  ownership  in determining  performance  are
particularly  relevant  to LDCs.  It is  interesting  to  note  that  these  issues
are  germane  also to  the  contracting  out  of public  services  though  it is
generally  assumed  that  contracting  out  is  a much  simpler  operation  than  the
privatization  of public  enterprises.
Many  LDCs are  still  in  the  early  stages  of their  privatization
programs. Some  may  have  initiated  privatization  programs  without
necessarily  thinking  through  the  issues  discussed  above,  in  part,  out  of
economic  necessity  when the  pressures  on them  to  act  were strong. It is
not surprising,  therefore,  that  the  side  effects  and  the  long-term
implications  of such  actions  are  not  always  taken  into  account  at the
planning  stage. It is  clear,  however,  that  the  expected  long  term  benefits
of  privatization  will  not  materialize  if these  issues  are  neglected. The
lessons  of experience  presented  above  will  hopefully  be of some  assistance
to governments  in  preparing  better  for  privatization.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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